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Abstract
Many companies have been successful differentiating themselves and creating growth
opportunities by developing a competitive advantage through their manufacturing
operations. During the last century, this operational advantage has generally included
economies of scale and the persistent pursuit of lower direct costs. However, this thesis
contends that a cost focused manufacturing organization encourages decisions that in the
long run make the organization rigid, inflexible and unable to implement innovations the
market desires. Not unexpectedly, those companies that fail to recognize and incorporate
changing market demands are relegated to reading about their competitor's successes in
newspapers and journals.
This thesis further presents an argument to shift the manufacturing organization's
operational focus away from cost and towards time. More specifically, this thesis posits
that firms should persistently pursue a reduction in the time required to manufacture a
customer's order from receipt to shipment.
The ideas here are based largely on literature research as well as insights gained during the
author's 6.5 month internship at ABB CNTDS. ABB CNTDS is a joint venture
manufacturer of power distribution transformers located in Shanghai, P.R. China.
Distribution transformers are produced in a make-to-order environment and include
significant engineering and customization for each customer's order. The concepts can,
however, be extended to any manufacturing organization looking to gain a competitive
advantage through speed, innovation, and customer focus - thereby avoiding the
undesirable state of low margin, cost competition.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Thesis Overview
1.1. Project Motivation
Many companies have been successful differentiating themselves and creating growth
opportunities by developing a competitive advantage through their manufacturing
operations. During the last century, this operational advantage has often included
economies of scale and the persistent pursuit of lower direct costs. However, this thesis
contends that a cost focused manufacturing organization encourages decisions that in the
long run make the organization rigid, inflexible and unable to implement innovations the
market desires. Not unexpectedly, those companies that fail to recognize and incorporate
changing market demands are relegated to reading about their competitor's successes in
newspapers and journals.
This thesis further presents an argument to shift the manufacturing organization's
operational focus away from cost and towards time. More specifically, this thesis posits
that firms should persistently pursue a reduction in the time required to manufacture a
customer's order from receipt to shipment.
1.2. Project Setting and Goals
The ideas here are based largely on literature research as well as insights gained during the
author's 6.5 month internship at ABB CNTDS. ABB CNTDS is a joint venture
manufacturer of power distribution transformers located in Shanghai, P.R. China.
Distribution transformers are produced in a make-to-order environment and include
significant engineering and customization for each customer's order. The concepts can,
however, be extended to any manufacturing organization looking to gain a competitive
advantage through speed, innovation, and customer focus - thereby avoiding the
undesirable state of low margin, cost competition.
The deliverables associated with this internship were:
11
* Operational Process Improvements - ConWIP implementation to move from
push based production to pull based production with the end result being
reduced manufacturing lead time.
* Material Inventory Reduction - Reduction of high-value material inventory.
Includes looking into purchasing procedures and engineering requirements.
e Change Implementation - outsider analysis of practical change at ABB
Shanghai with learnings that can potentially be applied to other China
subsidiaries of ABB.
1.3. Thesis Overview
This thesis is divided into three main parts. First, I use three well regarded models of
industrial dynamics to develop the idea that the traditional view of a competitive
advantage in manufacturing is based on economies of scale and efficiencies; the end result
of which is an inability to be responsive to changing market demands and further leads to
low margin, cost competition. Second, I present an alternative manufacturing philosophy
to shift the organization away from concentrating solely on cost and instead become
aligned to compete on responsiveness. Lastly, I provide an account of the practical
implementation of change towards a more responsive organization as carried out at ABB
CNTDS in Shanghai, P.R. China. Along with this account I have included an analysis and
general method for implementing change in an organization.
12
Chapter 2. Models of Industrial Dynamics
In this chapter I use three well regarded models of industrial dynamics to develop the idea
that the traditional view of a competitive advantage in manufacturing is based on
economies of scale and efficiencies, the end result of which is an inability to be responsive
to changing market demands leading to low margin, cost competition.
2.1. Utterback-Abernathy Model
The Utterback-Abernathy model of the Dynamics of Innovation is shown in Figure 1. The
rate of product innovation and process innovation are plotted over time. Product
innovation includes the underlying technology, market application, features and design.
Process innovation refers to the manufacturing capabilities and methods used to fabricate
or assemble the product. Utterback describes the three phases of industrial innovation as
follows:
Product innovation
Process innovation
Fluid Phase Transitional Specific Phase
Phase
Figure 1: Dynamics of Innovation'
During the fluid phase, a greater proportion of resources are devoted to product
development. There is technical uncertainty and design revisions are frequent. Prototypes
are constructed via makeshift manufacturing processes that are flexible and inefficient by
1 James M. Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, (Harvard Business School Press, 1994).
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mass-production measures. The organization's focus is on key product attributes such as
market need, performance and aesthetics. A firm can develop a competitive advantage in
the fluid phase through rapid prototyping, forecasting market needs, or competency in
research and development.
In the transitional phase, a dominant design tends to emerge and therefore the rate of
product innovation declines. However, the importance and rate of process innovation
increases to accommodate rising demand. Parts and materials become standardized and
production volume rises. The manufacturing process, while still somewhat flexible, is
heading towards rigidity where changes will be less easily accommodated. An appropriate
analogy being that of liquid concrete hardening over time. A competitive advantage in the
transitional phase results from providing the customer with value in product performance,
attributes and quality; whereby value is perceived relative to other options.
In the specific phase, the product and manufacturing process are tightly coupled such that
an innovation in either is difficult and costly. Product features are standard and common,
and quality is expected. During this phase, the industry dynamic is cost-based with low
cost manufacturing firms having a clear advantage.
The Utterback-Abernathy model is important because it highlights a shift in organizational
focus from product innovation to manufacturing process innovation as a means to
maximize the revenue gained from a dominant product design. Implied within the model
is the subsequent inflexibility to implement changes customers later require. This inability
to adapt opens up market space for new competitors, the competitive dynamics of which
are best described by the Christensen model of disruptive innovation.
2.2. Christensen Model of Disruptive Innovation
The characteristic Christensen model of industry dynamics is shown in Figure 2. An
incumbent firm is focused on the needs of Market 'A' and aligned for incremental
improvements in product features or process technology for that market. A smaller niche
or lower overall potential profit market (Market 'B') emerges, requiring a similar product
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or technology - yet one that is generally of lower performance and higher cost by Market
'A' standards. Given the incumbent firm's entrenchment in Market 'A' and it's tightly
coupled product and production processes, the incumbent chooses (either through active
thought or passive neglect) not to participate in the niche market. This decision creates an
opportunity for an entrant firm.
Christensen provides examples of industries where the performance and cost of the entrant
product or technology improved over time and eventually satisfied the needs of Market
'A'. This direct competition from below relegated the incumbent to obsolescence or
commoditization.
Incumbent Product Technology
- ~~ Market 'A' leed
-- Market B' Ieed
Disvuptive Entrant Product )Technology
T e elology-
Tine
Figure 2: Christensen Model of Disruptive Innovation2
The Christensen model provides a valuable analysis of the long term industry structure
that results when firms are too narrowly focused on the short term potential of what is
likely a dominant design. These firms have shifted away from product innovation and
towards process innovation to increase output and lower costs. In the process, they have
reduced the organizational and functional bandwidth available to satisfy the requirements
of all potential customers allowing niche market entry to future direct competitors.
2 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, (Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
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2.3. The Product Life Cycle
Figure 3 depicts a typical product's life cycle. Consumer demand is plotted against time
and we see the various stages from development to obsolescence. I have further
superimposed a curve depicting the cumulative profit potential over the life cycle of the
product.
During the development phase, money and other resources are invested in product
development with the hopes of earning a return on that investment through future sales.
And when - if- the product is introduced and revenue is generated, the firm begins to see
a return on investment. The potential rate of profit growth is highest during the
introduction and growth phase because the new product assumably has the most value to
the consumer relative to other options. This assumption generally holds true if the product
is innovative in performance, design, market application, or even cost basis (process
technology). And given this assumption, the company producing this product will likely
have the pricing power to generate higher margins.
Time
Figure 3: The Product Life Cycle3
As we move further along the product life cycle, competitors enter the market and the key
competitive metric becomes cost. Production efficiency is the benchmark, product
innovation is minimal, and companies strive for low cost manufacturing. It is at this point
3 Thomas Roemer (2002), The Art of Forecasting, Lecture given in 15.761 Operations Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
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that margins shrink and the product is commoditized or becomes obsolete. Either way, the
ability to gain sizeable profit margins disappears and often the product even creates a drain
on the companies resources - particularly as it is end-of-lifed or discontinued.
2.4. A Common Theme - Cost Based Competition
The three models introduced above all result in cost based competition (Fig. 4) for the firm
that is unable to adapt to changing market demands. Often, this is the result of
inextricably linking the product with the production process such that change is viewed as
prohibitively costly and the desire to protect short term interests weighs heavily. Unless
the firm has a distinct capability advantage as a low cost manufacturer (labor, experience,
product design, input materials, distribution) or a positional advantage resulting from
brand name or channel relationships, cost competition is generally not a favorable position
for firms to be in because customers have a wide choice of equivalent options to choose
from and the products are essentially commoditized. 
Cost Based Competition
Value Extracted
by Customer
Value Extracted
by Producer
Cost
Value Extracted
by Customer
,,-,Value Extracted
Cost by Producer
Figure 4: Cost Based Competition5
Furthermore, cost competition results in low pricing power, low profit margins and
therefore a diminished ability for a producer to extract value from the value chain. It is a
no win situation for everyone including the consumer due to slow product innovation.
4 Robert Grant, Contemporary Strategy Analysis: Concepts, Techniques, Applications, (Blackwell
Publishers, 2002).
5 D. Besanko, et al, Economics of Strategy, (John Wiley and Sons, 2004).
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Quality is no longer a competitive advantage but a requirement to garner attention from
the customer.6
2.4.1. The Alternative - Value Based Competition
Ideally, a producer would like to compete not on cost, but instead on value (Figure 5).
Notice in cost based competition there is a fundamental lower limit of zero value extracted
by the producer. However, in value competition, the potential to add value into the value
chain is limitless - as is the producers ability extract value (which would be akin to a
monopolistic situation).
Value Based Competition
Value Extracted
Value Extracted by Customer
by Customer
Value Extracted
Value Extracted 6y Producer
by Producer
Cost Cost
Figure 5: Value Based Competition7
Even if the product costs more to produce - resulting from "inefficient" manufacturing
practices - the producer is able to both charge and extract more because it remains in the
introduction and growth phase of the product lifecycle. Customers in turn are willing to
pay the higher price because they are receiving more value.
The question then becomes, what can a manufacturing firm do to avoid cost based
competition and position itself to both create and capture value for its customers? The
next section discusses two alternatives to low cost manufacturing. Namely, time and
customization.
6 Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
7 D. Besanko, et al, Economics of Strategy, (John Wiley and Sons, 2004).
18
Chapter 3. Value Based Competition
3.1. Time Based Competition
As a strategic weapon, time is the equivalent of
money, productivity, quality, and innovation.8
I was home for the holidays and frequently borrowed my father's car to run errands and
meet friends. On my way out one day, he gave me $15 and a coupon for a $14.99 oil
change (regularly $19.99) at a well known auto service retailer. I stopped at the store and
the attendant said it would be 2-4 hours and that I could leave the car and pick it up either
later that day or the next morning. I asked how long the actual oil change would take and
they told me 45 minutes to 1 hour. I consequently chose not to leave the car and instead
drove down the street to another retailer I knew specialized in fast oil changes with little
waiting. There were two garages with a waiting car in front of one. I pulled in front of
the second and 25 minutes later I had paid $24.99 and was leaving.
I paid a 67% premium over the first retailer because to me, time was the critical decision
factor. I assumed the quality of service was equivalent and further assumed there would
be some sort of guarantee on the work performed because I view an oil change as
essentially a commodity product. In this example, the quick-change retailer differentiated
itself and was able to both create and extract value from the consumer at a substantial
price premium.
In their book, Competing Against Time, George Stalk and Thomas Hout present examples
of companies that have used time compression to improve productivity, increase profit
margins, reduce risk and grow market share. These are businesses that have changed their
mission from "the most value at the lowest cost" to "the most value in the least amount of
time" and have been substantially rewarded with growth and profits. 9
8 George Stalk, Jr., and Thomas M. Hout, Competing Against Time, (Free Press, 1990).
9 Ibid.
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Returning to the oil change example, the faster retailer has almost 50% higher productivity
(from my unscientific inquiry into how long the actual oil change would take). Profit
margins are higher, and their market share is growing at the expense of the cost based
retailer if you assume there are other people like me. Even if the cost of goods sold or
labor input is higher, the time based competitor will have increased overall value to the
consumer more than enough to overcome this (see Figure 5).
Additionally, Stalk and Hout present the argument that overall business risk is reduced
with time compression. This is because there is less reliance on demand forecasting and
make to stock planning. And in dynamic systems, time delays add to the instability of the
system, increasing the chance for large variations in predicted outcome. 0
3.2. Mass Customization
Mass Customization is positioned as the opposite of mass production with all other forms
of large scale production lying somewhere in between (Fig. 6).
Make-To
Order
Mass Mass
Production Customization
Figure 6: Framework of large scale manufacturing
The extreme of mass production is exemplified by the first mass produced shoes in
America, called "straights" because there was no differentiation between the right and left
shoe". Now, however, Nike.com has a link, "Customize", on their website where not
only can customers order a right and a left shoe, but they can modify the color of nine
different areas on the shoe (3 billion different combinations) and add a personalized ID
label. 12 The next step for true mass customization would be to use an exact mold of
10 John Sterman, Business Dynamics, (McGraw Hill, 2000)
"1 Robert Reich, The Future of Success, (Vintage, 2002)
12 Homepage <http://www.nike.com>
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customers' feet to properly size the shoe. The make to order concept lies approximately in
the between mass production and mass customization - offering a more limited set of
color and size options with the key concept being that the product is not manufactured
until the customer chooses to purchase it.
Also included in the concept of mass customization is the flexibility to adapt to emergent
and niche segments of the market. 13 Not only does an athletic shoe manufacturer want to
produce a variety of shoes for larger segments (basketball, tennis, running, etc) instead of
a general purpose athletic shoe, but it also should be able to supply small emerging
segments such as skateboarding rather than allow a competitor entry. Being able to satisfy
these emerging markets guards against disruption from below.
In the book, Mass Customization, B. Joseph Pine describes modern mass production as the
continuation of decades of management thought stemming from the influence of
Taylorism, economies of scale and standardized interchangeable parts. He argues that this
paradigm evolved to include specialized machines that augmented low cost manufacturing;
and the system in turn was reinforced by a relatively localized, stable and content
market. 1
Market conditions have changed, however, such that there is less demand stability for the
singular products many of today's large organizations are aligned to produce. Global
markets want localization and customers want individualization. This does not mean firms
must always compete in times of turbulence. In fact, firms can diversify risk and
experience stable growth by offering customers a variety of products and options with
more frequent innovation cycles. However, this requires the realization that the modern
mass production system is ill suited to perform this task given its focus on economies of
scale.15
13 B. Joseph Pine, Mass Customization, (Harvard Business School Press, 1993).
14 Ibid.
" Ibid.
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3.3. Responsiveness
For the remainder of this thesis, I will describe speed and customization together with one
word- responsiveness. Competing based on responsiveness has the effect of keeping the
firm in or near the growth phase of the product life cycle where pricing power and profit
margins are sustainable. This is because the firm is able to adapt to and quickly
implement the incremental and simple changes required by customers that plague the
incumbent in Christensen's model.
The disruptive technology in Christensen's model is not disruptive to the customer.
Rather, it is value added to the customer. It is only disruptive to the incumbent firm that
fails to acknowledge or accept it. Furthermore, the disruptive technology is generally not
considered a technological breakthrough. Instead it is a simple adaptation of existing
knowledge to new markets and applications. 16 These insights are important because it
means a firm that is able to adapt to minor product and market dynamics is able to remain
in a sustainable competitive position without major technological strides17.
Being responsive also prevents the organization from progressing into the specific phase
detailed by the Utterback-Abernathy model. When responsiveness is in place, the product
and production process should never become so narrowly defined so as to make change in
either prohibitive. Furthermore, over time the organization will excel not only at
managing transitions, but at managing transitions when time is critical. And this fact
should not be overlooked as a valuable capability advantage.' 8
Today's consumer has a wealth of information in front of her such that the ability to
search for a better product or service is easier than ever.19 If one firm does not provide the
ideal product or service at a competitive price, rest assured another one will.
16 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma, (Harvard Business School Press, 1997).
17 This does not mean major technological innovation is not important to a firm wishing to introduce new
product lines. It only refers to allowing he current product line to compete on value rather than cost.
18 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, and Shona L. Brown, "Time Pacing: Competing in Markets that Won't Stand
Still", Harvard Business Review, March-April (1998).
19 Robert Reich, The Future of Success, (Vintage, 2002)
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Chapter 4. Implementing Responsiveness - Theory
In order to implement responsiveness as a strategic focus, the manufacturing organization
must be aligned to that goal. Bear in mind however, this is no trivial feat and in many
ways requires a significantly different thought process towards manufacturing and the
factory than found in modern mass production. Most importantly, it requires recognizing
that it is both managerially attainable and fiscally desirable to utilize a firm's
manufacturing operations as a strategic core competency rather than framing production as
a necessary encumbrance and cost burden.
To be sure, responsiveness requires change in all aspects of a corporation from research
and development to product design to sales and manufacturing. However, concurrent with
the focus of the author's internship this thesis will focus mainly on the factory and
production as applied in a make-to-order environment.
4.1. Moving Away from Cost Based Competition
Which came first, cost based competition or cost based performance measures? It is not
the purpose here to answer that question, but to point out that the two are one and the same.
Fundamentally, cost based performance measurement rewards efficiencies in the
production process. And it is this quest for production efficiency - the lowering of per unit
costs - that inevitably leads to the specific phase of the Utterback-Abernathy model where
inflexibility from product-process linkage is the defining characteristic. Measuring output,
utilization and on time delivery are all by-products of this paradigm. So, if cost based
competition is the end result, why is it that firms try so hard to get there?
In reality, customers are not concerned with a factory's efficiency or how utilized the
equipment is. Customers do not care how much output a factory produces. Customers are
indifferent as to a factory's overall quality or first pass yield - as long as their purchase
and every other product the factory actually ships is defect free. And customers are
uninterested in a factory's overall on time delivery; a factory could have 100% on time
delivery but if that time range is beyond the customer's requirement then it doesn't do
23
much good.20 Customers only care about receiving what they want, when they want it,
and at a competitive price to value. And they largely make decisions based on these
factors.
The Toyota Production System and Lean Manufacturing have gained wide acclaim as
companies have used their implementation to successfully improve their manufacturing
operations. However, this philosophy is best suited for high volume product lines with
relatively stable demand. Because the focus of lean manufacturing is using continuous
improvement practices to eliminate waste, improve quality, and reduce cost, the end
result is a highly efficient, low cost factory - a factory that has positioned the firm in the
specific phase of the Utterback-Abernathy model and is therefore ill-suited to address a
disruptive competitor as described by Christensen. This factory instead competes based
on cost in the steady state segment and eventually the decline segment of the product life
cycle.
4.2. Lead Time as a Metric
In a responsive organization, the key metric is lead time2 and the goal is a systematic
approach to reducing lead time in the value stream. The beauty of focusing on lead time
is the simplicity of having the organization aligned to only one metric. Systematically
concentrating on lead times enables easy identification of the seven forms of waste
commonly associated with the Toyota Production System and Lean Manufacturing:
Overproduction: Overproduction is considered the worst form of waste in a
factory.25 In a make to order environment, overproduction results when a customer
places an order and then refuses payment or cancels the order after it has started.
20 Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
2 George Stalk, Jr., and Thomas M. Hout, Competing Against Time, (Free Press, 1990).
Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
3 Lead time and cycle time are often used interchangeably, however for the purpose of this thesis lead time
will refer to the time required from customer order to customer receipt. This thesis will also assume a
degree of customization such that production is not started until the customer places the order. Cycle time
will refer to the actual in-process time of an individual workstation.
24 Ibid.
25 Kiyoshi Suzaki, The New Manufacturing Challenge, (Free Press, 1987)
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Removing time from the process reduces this probability and highlights deficient
customers. As mentioned previously, in a dynamic system time only adds to the
instability of the outcome.
Waiting Time: The Toyota Production System includes idle machines waiting on
26product as a waste. However, when thinking about responsiveness this is not
necessarily a concern and will be addressed in detail later. Waiting time for this
purpose only refers to anytime the customer's order is not occupying a machine,
person or transportation. For example, paperwork requiring a signature could be at
the bottom of a pile or a semi-finished product is queued in front of a machine to
be worked on.
. Transportation: While transportation is not considered waiting time, it is still a
burden on overall lead time and unnecessary transportation should be removed
from the value stream. This particular waste and its effect on lead time should be
studied carefully when making a decision to relocate production overseas based on
low labor costs.
. Excess Processing: Excess processing of a customer order consumes time and
should be removed from the value stream. Excess processing includes non value-
added steps prior to beginning production such as signatures or approvals, as well
as non value-added production operations such as inspections. Furthermore,
operations that can be removed from the flow through a better production process
or product design can be considered non value-added.
. Inventory Waste: Little's law tells us that high WIP means high lead times. This
also will be explored in more detail later. Additionally, excessive time in the
supply chain means inventory must be carried at a number of steps in the value
stream - tying up cash that could be used otherwise. One final consequence of
holding inventory is that as inventory becomes excessive or obsolete, the firm is
motivated to promote specific products to customers at discounted prices.
26 Kiyoshi Suzaki, The New Manufacturing Challenge, (Free Press, 1987)
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. Excess Motion: Employees looking for materials and tools, or walking long
distances to obtain required information adds time to the system. Employees
should have all required items and information when it is needed.
. Production Defects: Quality problems in the manufacturing process add to the
overall lead time because defective units spend time in rework loops and producing
defective parts utilizes manufacturing resources that could be processing non-
defective products. The potential production of defective parts also creates a need
for non-value added inspection steps that occupy a significant amount of time and
resources.
4.3. Quick Response Manufacturing
Quick Response Manufacturing is a thought process proposed by Rajan Suri in his book,
"Quick Response Manufacturing: A Companywide Approach to Reducing Lead Times".
In it, he identifies the pursuit of lead time reduction as the ideal goal for companies
wishing to compete on responsiveness. Furthermore, he identifies tenets of modem mass
production that must be changed in the minds of managers who wish to compete on
responsiveness.
e Traditional belief #1: 100% utilization of people and machines.
* Traditional belief #2: Raise efficiency and lower per unit costs.
- Traditional belief #3: 100% On Time Delivery.
4.3.1. Utilization
4.3.1.1. Variability Amplification
Variability amplification, commonly referred to as the "bull-whip effect" in supply chains,
is a result of the Variance Sum Law which states that for two independent random
variables, the combined variance is the sum of the individual variances. For supply chains,
this represents the minimum potential bull-whip effect.
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Variance Sum Law: ak±y = (2 + y
Individual component variances result from distinct boundaries between companies and
customers and include independent forecasting, system time delays and a general lack of
communication. These same factors can be present within a single factory or company in
the form of distinct functional areas, inefficient information mediums and the decoupling
of actual production from customer demand and planning processes. The end result is
high inventory (material, WIP, FG) and long lead times.
4.3.1.2. Little's Law
To understand the impact of variability on WIP and Lead Times further, we invoke the use
of Little's law which states that the total time a unit stays in a system (lead time) equals
the total number of units in the system (work in process) divided by the average number of
units produced per unit time (throughput 27 ).
Lead Time = WIP
Throughput
Notice the use of the term average in the last statement. When this is applied to
manufacturing systems, actual values for throughput are random functions with mean and
variance that comes from machine downtime, process time variance, operator variance, etc.
However, there exists an upper limit on the throughput of the system. Whereas the system
could and does have slower throughput all the way down to zero parts produced per unit
time, there is a maximum to how fast the system can produce to catch up. Therefore, if the
planning system plans for and releases production jobs based on a 100% capacity, the
production system will not be able to clear a buffer formed during low throughput periods
resulting in a growing queue of WIP.
27
27 Throughput = capacity-1
4.3.1.3. From Push to Pull Production
A change from push production to pull production addresses the need to decouple
production from customer demand and planning processes by introducing a feedback loop
into the system. Instead of releasing jobs into the system based on a start date derived
from forecasted demand and capacity, pull systems begin production based on signals
from downstream processes - where a downstream process can be either the next operation
or a customer order. This means that capacity information from downstream processes is
communicated to upstream operations. A common form of intra-factory pull production is
the kanban system often mentioned in articles and texts that describe the Toyota
Production System or Just-In-Time (JIT) manufacturing philosophies.
4.3.1.4. Kanbans
Figure 7: - Kanban control. Movement of parts shown in blue, circulation of kanbans in red. Machines are
shown as circles and buffers as triangles. The last buffer is the finished goods (FG) inventory.2 8
Kanban systems work by controlling the size of an inventory buffer between operations.
If the inventory buffer is full, the upstream operation does not produce another part.
Through continuous improvement activities, inventory buffer sizes can gradually be
reduced. The limiting of WIP between stations, and therefore the overall WIP in the
factory, has tremendous secondary effects. Not only is lead time reduced, but variation
resulting from other underlying production problems such as quality, excess inventory and
inefficient processes are exposed. Studies have shown that it is the ability of pull
production systems to highlight these secondary problems that provides the real
performance benefit compared to push systems.29
28 Abjoern M Bonvik, "How to Control a Lean Manufacturing System", <http://web.mit.edu/manuf-
sys/www/amb.summary.html>
29 Spearman, et al. "CONWIP: a pull alternative to kanban.", Int. J. Prod. Res., 28:5 (1990)
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However, kanban systems have a fundamental weakness in that the inventory buffer
between operations only protects downstream operations from upstream variation.
Upstream operations are still prone to downstream demand variations amplified
throughout the system; resulting in excess WIP and inventory.3 0 For this reason, kanban
can be an ineffective solution in factories with job orders or short production runs,
processes that have significant setup times or expectedly high yield losses, or customer
markets with large demand variation. Therefore, in these situations an alternative pull
system is needed.
4.3.1.5. ConWIP
ConWIP (Continuous Work-In-Process) extends the kanban concept to include a larger
segment of the production line and potentially the entire production line. Appendix A
provides a breakdown of ConWIP parameters.
Figure 8: CONWIP control. Movement of parts shown in blue, circulation of release authorizations in
green.
Whereas kanban feeds demand information upstream through parts inventory at individual
operations (succumbing to variability amplification), the ConWIP method controls
inventory in the entire line by only allowing a new job to begin production when another
job finishes production. This information medium is less susceptible to noise because the
flow of information is separated from the flow of parts. As opposed to kanban, the resting
state in a ConWIP process is zero buffer inventory which means lower overall inventory
during normal operation.33 And lower overall inventory means lower lead times.
30 Abjoern M Bonvik, "How to Control a Lean Manufacturing System", <http://web.mit.edu/manuf-
sys/www/amb.summary.html>
31 Spearman, et al. "CONWIP: a pull alternative to kanban.", Int. J. Prod Res., 28:5 (1990)
32 Abjoern M Bonvik, "How to Control a Lean Manufacturing System", <http://web.mit.edu/manuf-
sys/www/amb.summary.html>
3 Ibid.
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In effect, ConWIP envelops the entire production system under Little's Law. Compared to
a push production system, the variable of control is factory WIP instead of factory
capacity. This is beneficial because WIP is easy to see and count whereas capacity is
difficult to measure and often subjective - especially when applied to high product mix
environments. 34 Compared to kanban, ConWIP provides greater support to
responsiveness because the production philosophy changes from the desire for parts
(buffer inventory) being available when the equipment is ready, to the equipment being
available when orders arrive. This insight leads to the conclusion that factory managers
should account for throughput variability and prevent WIP buildup by strategically
planning to operate at 70%-80% of bottleneck capacity. Note that this strategy also takes
into account the effects of the upper capacity limit constraint such as inventory queues and
long lead times.3 5
High
variability
Response
time
~ variability
o Resource 70
utilization
Figure 9: Effect of Utilization and Variability on Lead Time36
4.3.1.6. Utilization
Strategically planning to operate below full capacity should be viewed by managers as an
investment rather than a cost. The return on investment comes from higher quality, better
productivity, lower material inventory requirements, increased sales and contented
3 Spearman, et al. "CONWIP: a pull alternative to kanban.", Int. J. Prod. Res., 28:5 (1990)
3 Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
36 Ibid.
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customers, and reduced overhead - all byproducts of reduced lead times. In the long term,
this investment in capacity is financially prudent. A simple example is as follows: If one
factory operates at 90% utilization and has 70% yields, the net value added output is .9
x .7 = 63% of capacity. Whereas another factory operating at 80% utilization with 90%
yields has net value added output of .8 x .9= 72% of capacity. 37 Remember that
customers and their money do not care what the utilization of your machines are, only that
they are getting the product they want when they want it. This simple example shows how
both parties can benefit from accounting for throughput variability.
4.3.2. Efficiency and Unit Cost
So what is it about excess capacity that makes factory managers cringe at the suggestion of
its strategic importance? Frequently, it is high fixed cost investments in specialized
machines. One raises production efficiency by spreading machine depreciation and
factory overhead costs over a greater number of units. This action indeed presents a
logical case for high utilization. However, raising production efficiency encourages
behavior that is extremely detrimental to lead times and ultimately negatively impacts the
business financials as well as the company's ability to be responsive.
4.3.2.1. Financial Metrics and Operational Decisions
Often in manufacturing organizations there is a disconnect between the financial
accounting and the operational practices used to generate those financial requirements.
The main financial indicators are profit, return on investment and cash flow. Profit is
undoubtedly the goal of the company; but the investment used to generate that profit needs
to be understood as well and so we want to include an analysis of return on investment
(ROI). Moreover, a company that generates a profit on paper but has negative cash flow
will quickly fmd itself unable to pay its bills and continue operating. Unfortunately,
operationally these three financial goals are interpreted as cost performance goals which
leads the company into the low cost manufacturing realm. The following bullets
37 Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
38 Eliyahu Goldratt, and Robert Fox, The Race, (North River Press, 1986).
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represent operational decisions are commonly made in order to lower costs and thereby
raise efficiency:
" Capital equipment evaluations based on reducing per unit costs: Highly specialized,
fixed cost capital investments have been mentioned quite frequently throughout this
thesis as an impediment to responsiveness and an impetus towards cost competition.
It is typically the forecast of continued or increasing demand for the same product
without considering potential value added changes or disruptive innovations that lead
companies to invest heavily here.
e Economic order quantities and batching: The EOQ analysis attempts to optimize
the trade-offs associated with setup costs and inventory holding costs. However,
there are other factory dynamics at play especially when a factory produces multiple
product configurations. These include the costs of not detecting a quality problem
until a large batch has completed, costs attributable to obsolescent material and the
need to make engineering revisions, the effect of large batches on lead times and late
delivery fees, and the market value of being able to provide the customer an order in
less time.39
" Volume discounts: Whereas volume discounts are beneficial for ensuring factory
loadings, they only encourage decisions that move the organization towards cost
competition. This is especially true if the capital equipment reinforces volume
discounts or if other customers are turned away because of a lack of capacity. Suri
suggests working with customers to reduce the need for volume orders by proving
the factory's ability to deliver smaller quantities as needed.
e Building ahead: Factories build ahead either to save on setup costs or to occupy
slack resources. Building ahead to save on setup costs means that one customer's
order is being unintentionally prioritized over another customer. Slack people
resources can be put to more long term productive uses such as advanced skill
training or lead time reduction projects. Furthermore, slack people resources could
39 Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
40 Ibid.
32
be moved to areas of the factory that are not currently over staffed. As for slack
equipment resources and in addition to the argument of excess capacity as an
investment, maintenance schedules can be rearranged, the equipment can be used for
training, or the equipment could be used to bring another product into the factory.
4.3.2.2. Aligning Finance and Operations
The above operational decisions have a common negative effect on lead time. Parts that
are not immediately wanted by a customer are occupying resources that could otherwise
be utilized towards producing parts that have been requested. The end result is a negative
effect on the lead time of actual customer orders.
As an alternative to cost and efficiency based metrics, Goldratt and Fox identify key
operational concepts from The Goal4 that more directly relate to the three key financial
metrics mentioned above.
e Throughput: The rate at which money is generated through sales (not
production). If something is produced but not sold, then it does not count as
throughput. Notice that the last statement also will take into account the
negative effects of quality problems.
- Inventory: Money invested in purchasing materials intended to be sold.
- Operating Expenses: Money spent to turn inventory into sales. Includes direct
labor, management, support functions, and equipment depreciation, but
excludes as waste any function not related to turning material into sales.
The main idea is that higher throughput, lower inventory, and lower operating expenses all
directly improve net profits, return on investment, and cash flow. Operationally, decisions
therefore should not be based on the impact to cost but on the net impact to these three
41 Eliyahu Goldratt, and Jeff Cox, The Goal, (Gower Publishing Limited, 1986).
42 Eliyahu Goldratt, and Robert Fox, The Race, (North River Press, 1986).
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A
categories. Notice also, that through Little's Law we can combine higher throughput and
lower inventory (includes WIP) into one metric - lead time.
4.3.3. On Time Delivery
The problem with On Time Delivery as a metric is that it does not reflect the production
system's ability to meet customer needs. When customers place an order, the firm tells
them the soonest it can provide that product based on its own internal lead time. If that
time frame is too long, the customer goes somewhere else (as I did for an oil change).
Some customers do choose to wait and the production system's performance to its own
internally generated metric is measured. Even if the company is operating at 100% On
Time Delivery, where is the fact that some customers are leaving to go elsewhere
accounted for? Additionally, what happens when the production system starts falling
behind its OTD performance goal? To answer this last question it is appropriate to
understand the dynamics of the failure in the first place:
4.3.3.1. The Response Time Spiral
When management sets a target for the OTD performance of the factory, everything
becomes aligned to that performance indicator including sales, production scheduling and
purchasing. The factory is planned to operate at a high utilization to raise efficiencies and
lower per unit costs which, as previously shown, creates long lead times and WIP queues.
Upon seeing "important" orders falling behind, management elevates the status of these
orders to priority or "hot". They are then able to speed through the factory at the expense
of other jobs that then fall behind schedule. Some factories even progress to an out-of-
control state where eventually every job had some sort of priority assigned to it.4 3
The natural response of management is to link lead times as an inevitable byproduct of
increased size and output. Therefore, to ensure the company is able to quote customers a
realistic delivery date and guarantee on time delivery performance, the projected lead
4 "Vandelay Industries, Inc.", Harvard Business School Publishing (Cases), 698049.
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times are increased. 44 Notice that there is no feedback from the customer in this process
and more importantly, from the customer's point of view the value of the metric has in fact
worsened.
OTD Goal
Set at 100%
Buffer Sizes, Lead Times
set to meet OTD Goal
Increase Lead Time
or Buffer Size
OTD of 100% is
Achieved
Begin Missing
OTD target
Fig. 10: Response Time Spira 4 5
In order to create a responsive mentality in manufacturing, the organization must embrace
lead time as the key success metric. Traditional operations beliefs centered around
utilization, costs, efficiencies and on time delivery are not appropriate in today's high
clockspeed, global environment where customers have an unprecedented ability to find
exactly what they are looking for. Furthermore, focusing on lead times aligns the entire
organization towards removing waste and improving the ability of the manufacturing
organization to be responsive to customer needs. The next section provides a detailed
analysis of actual steps taken to improve responsiveness in a make-to-order environment.
44 Rajan Suri, Quick Response Manufacturing, (Productivity Press, 1998).
45 Matt Joing, "Applicability of Lean Manufacturing and Quick Response Manufacturing in a High-Mix
Low-Volume Environment", Masters Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004.
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Chapter 5. Implementing Responsiveness at ABB CNTDS
5.1. Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd.
We have conducted a thorough review of global market dynamics and our
core strengths. We found that we only need to fine-tune operations... We will
not base growth on major acquisitions...
-Jurgen Dormann, CEO ABB Ltd., 200346
ABB Ltd. is a global leader in providing utility and industrial customers with automation
and power technologies. The company has headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland and was
formed in 1988 as the result of a merger between the Swedish Asea and the Swiss Brown
Boveri.47  As of 2004, the company employs 105,000 employees in 100 countries (down
from 140,000 employees at the end of 2002).
ABB is now comprised of two divisions: Automation Technologies and Power
Technologies. The Automation Technologies division includes Business Areas for
Automation Products, Manufacturing Automation and Process Automation. This division
delivers products and services for measurement, control, motion, protection, and plant
optimization for process, discreet and utility industries. The Power Technologies division
includes Business Areas for Transformers, Medium-Voltage Products, High-Voltage
Products, Power Systems, and Utility Automation Systems. This division serves electric,
gas and water utilities as well as industrial and commercial customers.
5.2. Approach to Lean in Power Technologies Transformers49
ABB's Transformer Business Area (BA) has 58 factories world wide. In 2002 the BA
created a structured approach to improving responsiveness5 0 generic enough to implement
across the mix of globally dispersed independent factories. The three areas of focus for
46 ABB Group Annual Report 2003, Operational Review. Zurich, Switzerland: AJBB Group, 2003.
41 Ibid.
48 Homepage. <http://www.abb.com/about>
49 Michelle E. Bemson, "The Value of a Common Approach to Lean", Masters Thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2004.
'0 The official documentation for CP3 describes it as an approach to Lean Implementation. However, given
the actual goal of reduced lead time in a make-to-order environment this thesis will refer to it as
responsiveness.
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the Common Pull Production Practices (CP3) are continuous flow, pull production control,
and supply chain integration. However, ultimately the desired result is reduced lead times:
. Continuous flow is a combination of eliminating time wasted due to waiting,
inventory, and motion.
. Pull production is the elimination of time wasted from overproduction, defects, and
excess processing.
. Supply chain integration is an attempt to transfer these principles to suppliers and
includes improving sourcing and purchasing procedures.
5.3. ABB CNTDS, Shanghai, P.R. China
ABB Shanghai Transformer Co. Ltd. (CNTDS) is a joint venture manufacturer of medium
voltage power distribution transformers and part of the PTTR Business Area. The
managing partners are ABB Ltd. through its ABB China Investment Ltd. subsidiary (51%)
and the state owned Shanghai Electrical Apparatus Co. through the Shanghai Power T&D
Co. Ltd. (49%).
ABB CNTDS was formed on Oct. 6, 1994. Prior to the joint venture the company was
know as Shanghai Transformer Works and had been producing transformers at the site
since the 1920s - most recently (prior to the joint venture) producing oil-immersed
transformers and dry cast transformers. In 1992 the Shanghai Transformer Works began
licensing the Resibloc* process technology from ABB. Thus, when ABB began looking
for entry into the Chinese market, the Shanghai Transformer Works was a natural partner.
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ABB CNTDS functions as an individual
profit center as part of the Transformers
Business Area within the Power
Technologies division. The company
produces three main product lines all with
rated voltage less than 35KV. Dry-type
Resibloc® transformers range in capacity
from 100KVA to 12,500MVA. Medium
sized oil-immersed transformers range in
capacity from 50KVA to 6.3MVA. Lastly,
large oil-immersed distribution transformers
range in capacity from 2.5MVA to 25MVA.
Major customer segments for ABB
Shanghai include utilities, industrial end
users and construction firms; and are divided
into three main geographies: greater
Shanghai, China and export, with domestic
sales far outweighing exports. Each unit's
configuration is specified by the customer
and engineered to order. Differentiation
occurs at the first step in the process, so
units are not started without a specific
customer order.
Dry-Type (w/o enclosure)
Oil-Immersed Medium
Oil-Immersed Large
Figure 11: Power Distribution Transformers
At the beginning of June 2004, ABB CNTDS' factory operations could be described as
bloated, segmented and misaligned. Revenue growth for the year was projected at 25-30%
(with an accompanying unit increase of -40%); however, after only 5 months material
inventory had increased 128% and Finished Goods 50%. This was having a detrimental
effect on cash flow (-63%) and placing the company in an undesirable financial situation.
This LFM internship was in support of the already planned CP3 (Common Pull Production
Practices) implementation.
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5.4. Dry Transformer Production Flow
Dry-type Resibloc* transformers are used in applications where customers need to
minimize environmental contamination and fire hazards. Because of high demand and
higher profits from the Resibloc* transformer line (compared to oil-filled), this internship
focused on improving responsiveness here first. The dry-type assembly process requires
two main subassemblies: windings and a core.
The transformer core consists of layered magnetic steel. Rolled magnetic steel is slit to
the proper width and then cut to the proper length and shape. The cut pieces are stacked
by hand and secured in a frame.
Each transformer has 3 windings. Windings begin with insulation material that is cut and
glued. The next step is to wind copper foil" and the insulation material to create the low
voltage winding. The high voltage windings are created by winding enamel coated copper
wire and glass fiber rovings that have been dipped in an epoxy (used for insulation) around
the previously constructed low voltage winding. The entire winding is then put into an
oven to cure the epoxy. After curing, the windings are cleaned by grinding away the
excess, clumped epoxy from the ends. At this point the windings are also given a
resistance test. High voltage winding is the designed capacity constraint due to machine
speed. Furthermore, in order to maintain the chemical properties of the epoxy the high
voltage winding process must be done in a temperature controlled environment.
Final assembly consists of placing each winding around the stacked cores. Additional
required assembly parts and optional accessory items such as temperature meters and tap
changers are also added. The assembled transformer is then taken to a testing area to
check for quality problems such as short circuits and ensure the proper voltage and power
ratings are met. The transformer is then placed into an enclosure and prepared for
shipment.
5 Most of the world has switched to Aluminum foil and wire because it is less expensive. However, the
Chinese government requires transformers to be constructed of Copper.
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5.5. Improving Responsiveness at ABB CNTDS
5.5.1. Production Philosophy
In line with the goal of improving factory responsiveness, lead time became the top metric
of focus. Consistent with the CP3 learnings, a ConWIP process was implemented to limit
work-in-process. Clipboards were designated as the release cards and stayed with the
transformer from insulation through assembly. Test and Enclosure were excluded from
the ConWIP process due to the high capacity available in test and the variation in whether
a job would have an enclosure assembly or not. A production board was constructed to
hold the paperwork corresponding to the sequence of release.
Clipboards
sequence
Start C&e
Authorization
Figure 12: ConWIP Pull Production Board
The winding subassembly process has a much longer throughput time than the core
subassembly process. Therefore, when a transformer finished assembly and a clipboard
was released, this would signal production to begin the next job's insulation and the
clipboard would travel through the winding loop. However, an additional signal was
given to the core manufacturing area alerting them to which order number was released
and authorizing them to begin construction of the core.
41
The ConWIP calculation set the target inventory level between 30-35 transformers. This
was a substantial reduction from an average of over 60 units in process. To facilitate a
gradual implementation, the number of clipboards was initially set at 45 and progressively
reduced over a month long period.
Figure 13: ConWIP cards in Insulation
Whereas the key system metric was lead time, an important benefit that should not be
overlooked was the following of a production sequence. Jobs were not pushed into the
system based on a start date, but were pulled into the system based on the release sequence
and an available ConWIP card (Appendix D). The following of a sequence ensured some
orders would not be started ahead of others at the request of individuals or because
materials were not available. The creation of an agreed upon sequence thereby aligned the
entire organization to the system.
5.5.2. Production Planning and Scheduling
Planning and scheduling was being done on a monthly basis during the middle of the
preceding month. Therefore, planning was effectively done between 2-6 weeks in
advance of actual production - incredible given that the plan included start/finish dates as
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well as what days the order should be in High Voltage Winding (the constraint operation).
This decidedly "push" method of production planning led to a lack of integration between
departments; planning would set schedules for engineering drawings to be completed,
materials to be purchased and production to begin and then consider themselves absolved
of further responsibility. Additionally, high finished goods, WIP and material inventories
resulted as customers would request delays in delivery or even cancel an order. The poor
communication meant material arrived as scheduled or the transformer was still produced
as scheduled. Cores were often waiting on uncompleted windings or windings were
waiting on uncompleted cores. And the push nature of this system only added to the high
WIP build up causing delays and missed delivery dates.
Disruptions were common and the sales department would frequently ask production to
expedite one order without considering the consequential delays to other orders. The
factory had been through many iterations of the response time spiral and was allowing for
excessive amounts of buffer time in the system. Actual total cycle-time time averaged less
than 10 days but production throughput time was close to 30 days.
5.5.2.1. Cross Department Integration
The planning and scheduling process was revamped in order to reduce scheduling
commitment from 2-6 weeks to less than 1 week. A weekly meeting was held on
Wednesdays to set the schedule for the following week. Required attendees included
representatives from manufacturing, sales, materials purchasing, and planning (Appendix
E). The sales department was asked to confirm the delivery date with the customer, the
material purchasing department confirmed material availability, and the planning
department confirmed there was available capacity. If any of the three requirements
(order, material, capacity) were not given the go-ahead the job was not added to the
production sequence.
The actual scheduling process was time consuming and relied on assumptions, perceptions
and experience. The planner would take confirmed job orders and place them in a
production schedule based on the KVA rating of the transformer. The KVA rating was
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roughly correlated to the process time at the factory constraint, HV Winding; however
there were instances where different designs with identical KVA ratings would have large
deviations in processing times at HV Winding as well as at other operations. Therefore
basing capacity on KVA was error prone and added to delays and high WIP.
It was clear a change in the production scheduling process was needed.
5.5.2.2. Sequencing Software Tool
Meetings were held with production and planning personnel to determine the cycle times
at each operation for different designs and KVA ratings. I then developed a Microsoft
Excel based scheduling tool that automatically establishes a production start date based on
the delivery date and actual cycle times (Appendix F). However, it is important to note
that this production start date was not a required start date but instead was used to
determine the production sequence and provide a reference point for where the factory was
in relation to committed delivery dates. With the understanding that the cycle times were
loosely derived and prone to inflation, the software scheduling tool was intentionally
configured such that the operation cycle times could be easily updated as necessary.
In addition to creating a production sequence, the scheduling tool was programmed to
generate graphs showing daily and weekly capacity usage at the factory constraint
(Appendix G). This capacity usage is based on processing time rather than KVA rating
and proved to be quite useful and accurate in helping to establish consistency across weeks.
Furthermore it provided visibility into future delivery commitments and capacity usage.
This visibility allowed the sales department to quickly evaluate and commit to customer
orders - reducing front end lead times.
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5.5.3. Reducing High Value Material Inventory
5.5.3.1 Copper Wire
Between Dec. 31, 2003 and May 31, 2004 the total quantity by weight of copper wire had
increased 110%. This is despite a supplier lead time of less than two weeks. Critical
design dimensions are wire thickness and width. Between January, 2003 and July, 2004
ABB Shanghai used approximately 150 different wire types. A transformer's end
operating characteristics are largely determined based on the combination of copper wire
and copper foil design dimensions. Therefore, in order to allow for a reduction in
available copper foil sizes (discussed shortly), a reduction in wire types for standardization
purposes was not an option.
ABB CNTDS used two main wire suppliers. Wire was ordered by job number and the
order was placed to coincide with the monthly planning process previously described.
This unfortunately led to unneeded coils of wire when orders were delayed or cancelled.
Furthermore, wire was delivered and placed in the warehouse unsystematically which
meant time was spent looking for the appropriate coils.
The quantity of wire ordered was determined based on the engineering drawing with an
extra 5% added to compensate for tolerance purposes. This resulted in a large amount of
small quantity rolls waiting to be consumed at a later point (wire ends could be welded
together). A standing agreement was in place that wire coils less than 40kg would be
scrapped52 immediately; however, this process was not being followed. Not only was the
monetary value of this inventory creating a burden on the balance sheet, but the abundance
of wire rolls was taking up a great deal of space.
The first step was to run an inventory report of all wire on hand to provide an analytical
framework. The minimum holding requirement was increased to 60kg meaning any rolls
less than that amount were automatically scrapped. Additionally, the engineering
department was given the list and highlighted additional rolls that could be sold back to
2 Copper is a commodity material and, when scrapped, is sold back at the commodity market price. This
price is lower than the current purchase price because production costs are included.
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the copper suppliers. A resource intensive undertaking to label all remaining wire rolls
with a job number was performed and any wire rolls purchased for old or cancelled jobs
were red tagged and relocated. Finally, the copper wire suppliers agreed to affix the job
number to every new order.
A single copper wire supplier was then identified to be the main supplier and an agreement
was made that all orders would be placed with them under the following conditions: the
supplier would make three deliveries a week as opposed to once or twice, and the wire
would be ordered 10 days in advance of production start but the wire supplier would hold
it in their facility until is was "called off' by the wire purchaser. The wire purchaser was
responsible for checking the pull production board and alerting the copper wire supplier to
which jobs would be needed in the next few days. And only those job number orders
would be accepted by the warehouse. This new incoming material policy greatly helped
reduce the copper wire inventory on hand and free up space. Additionally, reliance on one
supplier was deemed low risk as the second supplier could be used in the future if needed.
5.5.3.2. Core Steel
Core steel is purchased as master coils (1000mm) and then slit on site to the required
dimensions, or it can be purchased in pre-slit dimensions. ABB CNTDS transformers
typically use steel widths of 100-500mm. Purchasing master coils and slitting on site is
preferred due to the varying dimension needs based on transformer parameters.
Corporate ABB negotiates steel contracts with suppliers and rations them across the
individual subsidiaries. This gives ABB purchasing power with suppliers due to the
quantities of steel negotiated. Therefore, ABB CNTDS has a maximum quantity of
master coils it can purchase from certain suppliers whereas other suppliers provide pre-slit
material of which there is also a maximum quantity.
Pre-slit steel is provided mainly because the maximum size coil ABB CNTDS' slitting
machine can handle is 1000mm and the suppliers have master coils greater than 1000mm
(generally between 1000-1200mm). Slit widths were ordered based on forecasted need
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and had a lead-time of 1-2 weeks. This process was altered such that, now, the top 5 most
commonly used widths are ordered in constant quantity every month (enough to ensure it
will undoubtedly all be consumed). Each of these widths will come off of a larger master
coil and the remaining coil (800-1000mm) will not be slit further by the supplier, but
instead shipped to ABB CNTDS and used similarly as a normal master coil (Fig. 14).
Rest delivered
to CNTDS as master coil Standard width:
250,230,210, 190, 170 (mm)
Supplier master coil
1020~1200
Fig. 14: Core Steel Purchasing
This change reduced the need to forecast specific width needs and gave ABB CNTDS
more flexibility. The factory was able to both reduce inventory and become more
responsive at the same time because master coils could in turn be cut to any needed
dimension.
Engineering drawings for the steel slitting/cutting departments only included width and
weight information. This is because steel is stored as inventory by weight given it is easy
to weigh. Whereas it may be easy to weigh, the ultimate application requires knowing its
length5 3 as it is unwound and cut. Additionally, steel inventory was being tracked solely
for financial purposes and therefore the only value known was the combined weight of all
steel.
Engineers are now providing the length of steel required in addition to the weight on the
drawings. Furthermore, the factory personnel were given the additional responsibility to
maintain a detailed inventory of steel listing the individual coils' weights and widths, and
" The density of the steel is constant at (7650 kg/M3 ), so conversion between weight and length can be
accomplished.
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I developed a Microsoft Excel tool to assist them in maintaining this data (Appendix H).
The operators only need to enter the inventory coils' weights and the software will
perform the calculation and provide a list of the corresponding lengths. Working with
length information as opposed to weight allows for faster and more accurate, materially
efficient decision-making of which coils to use for each job.
5.5.3.3. Copper Foil
Copper foil is used to create the transformer's low voltage windings. The critical
dimensions are thickness and width and it is not slit on site due to stringent quality
requirements. Copper foil can be purchased domestically with a 1 month lead time or
from Germany with a maximum three month lead time: shipping = one month, production
= two weeks, supplier capacity/material allocation = six weeks. However, the domestic
foil is 20% more expensive than German foil even after including import taxes and
transportation costs. Due to the large cost difference between the local and foreign
suppliers, it made practical business sense to purchase abroad despite the long lead time.
However, this does not mean ABB CNTDS was not able to make procedural changes that
allowed for increased responsiveness despite this predicament.
During the period from January 2003 to June 2004, 60 different foil types were used with
large variations in the frequency and quantity of use. Engineers choose one foil type over
another because it results in less overall material used. Note that the copper foil
dimension chosen affects the quantity of copper foil required as well as the quantity of
core steel and copper wire needed.
From the 60 dimensions used over the preceding 18 months, the engineering department
developed a list of 33 "standard" foil types that would be able to accommodate all
transformer designs. Through critical analysis and unit cost comparison, it was shown that
even though a transformer may use less material overall with a non-standard foil type, if it
is designed with a standard foil type purchased from Germany and then compared to a
design using the ideal non-standard foil assumed purchased locally, the overall cost of
transformer material is lower due to the 20% difference in foil cost.
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A historical analysis of monthly foil consumption was performed and a target inventory
level for each standard foil type was set according to the highest monthly consumption
during the preceding 18 months for that foil (Appendix I). The cumulative amount
computed was only 43% of the total foil in inventory at the end of May 2004. It was clear
that ABB CNTDS would benefit by reducing the number of foil types available to
designers and purchasing all foil from Germany. There would not only be a benefit from
the reduction in cost of goods sold, inventory burden, and space, but ABB CNTDS could
also maintain a drastically lower stock of foil on hand that would still accommodate any
normal make-to-order request.
Obviously, a large unit quantity purchase of alike transformers would present a problem if
request for delivery was immediate. However, ABB CNTDS' management noted that
large quantity orders were almost always negotiated far in advance (nobody needs an
immediate delivery of that many units) and the local supplier with a shorter lead time
could also be used if necessary. Management benefits and responsiveness gained for an
order that would actually require responsiveness more than offset the risk.
Again a change in the purchasing procedures and better visibility into known future needs
would be required to make this strategic change a long term success. I developed a
Microsoft Excel based tool to provide a link to the planning process and allow visibility
into the foil needs of known contracts, planned purchases, and the target inventory levels.
By maintaining a month's worth of inventory, the lead-time effectively is reduced
assuming non-extravagant changes in demand. At the end of the internship, ABB CNTDS
was discussing reserving a certain amount of supplier capacity in advance and providing
weekly updates of tentatively planned individual dimension orders. This would
effectively cut the lead time of foreign foil down to only the production and transportation
time.
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5.5.4. Metrics Results
The following charts show the results obtained as a result of the change implementation
previously described. It is important to keep in mind that annual revenue growth for 2004
was 35% and the annual unit production volume increased approximately 45% compared
to the previous year.
Figure 15: Inventory Reduction Results
Despite the increase in annual revenue and unit volume production, ABB CNTDS was
able to reduce both copper foil and copper wire inventories to quantities lower than at the
end of 2003. Changes in purchasing procedures, inventory management, and engineering
design criteria were implemented as part of the goal to improve responsiveness during this
internship (June - December).
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Figure 16: Revenue Growth and Cash Flow
Revenue growth was calculated by extrapolating projected year end revenue from monthly
revenue figures. Cash flow improvements from May through December were a result of a
decrease in Accounts Receivable, Material Inventory, and Finished Goods inventory over
that time period.
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Figure 17: Inventory / Revenue
ABB CNTDS set a goal of 7.5% for inventory as a percentage of revenue. WIP inventory
remained approximately the same from May to December; however, it decreased relative
to revenue, and was 25% lower than at the end of 2003. The substantial reduction in high-
value material inventory previously described also helped to reach this goal.
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Figure 18: Lead Time and Output
The ConWIP policy implementation reduced production lead time by over 50%.
Additionally, overall output increased 15% after ConWIP implementation and factory
relocation. However, the factory relocation did not include an increase in equipment or
overall floor space.
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Chapter 6. Analysis of Change Implementation
6.1. The Three Lenses
Implementing change is a daunting task for any individual in any organization. There are
both advantages and disadvantages to being an outsider new to the organization or an
insider with a working history within the organization. The one certainty is that there is no
recipe for influencing and creating change. A model or step by step guide would be both
restrictive and inappropriate due to the intrinsic complexity of organizations. However,
one method that has gained acceptance, particularly at the MIT Sloan School of
Management, is to view the organization through three lenses: Strategically, Culturally,
and Politically (stakeholders). These three lenses provide a framework to locally evaluate
change and its effect on the organization.54
The strategic lens highlights the strategy and goals of the organization. It is forward
looking and rational. Through the strategic lens, the people within the organization have
skills and capabilities that can be positioned and linked to optimize the overall value of the
organization. It is the strategic lens that brings about words and phrases such as
"economies of scope / scale" and "the whole is greater than the parts". The strategic lens
identifies what the end result should look like along with the requirements and tasks to
accomplish that result.
The cultural lens attempts to identify beliefs and ideas that have become ingrained within
both the organization and individuals. These are the foundations that both consciously and
subconsciously influence actions and decisions. Using the cultural lens, one attempts to
gain insight into the traditions that add meaning and value to the individuals and
momentum to the direction of the organization. The cultural lens is, perhaps, the most
difficult and complex of the lenses because one attempts to apply logic to seemingly
irrational individual and group behavior.
5 Ancona, D. et al, Managing for the Future - Organizational Behavior and Processes, (South-Western
College Publishing Co., 1999).
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If the strategic lens is forward looking and cultural lens is historically oriented, then the
stakeholder lens is an objective view of the present. With the stakeholder lens, one
recognizes that the organization is indeed comprised of individuals with their own
personal agendas and relationships. There are managers and subordinates, and individuals
or groups with influence and interests. The stakeholder lens is polarizing in that it filters
claims of responsibility and territories of ownership. A manager who strategically has a
roadmap needs the stakeholder lens to recognize potential individuals, groups, and sunk
costs that have the resources and influence to hinder or facilitate progress.
6.2. Strategic Lens Analysis
In 2003 an article published in the Harvard Business Review entitled "IT Doesn't
Matter"55 was received with great debate. The point author Nicolas Carr argued was that
Information Technology was becoming so prevalent in business that it could no longer be
considered a competitive advantage for one company over another. Instead, it was a
necessity just for entry into the competitive landscape. The same type of argument could
be formed for China. Whereas previously companies referred to their China operations as
an important competitive cost advantage, today it is uncommon not to have operations in
China or sourcing from China. The competitive advantage comes not from cost
competition but from the growth opportunities present in the vast Chinese market. And
those companies that are responsive to the needs of the Chinese market will ultimately fare
the best.
As do most other multinational firms, ABB recognizes China as an important strategic
location. However, China's importance to ABB does not reside in its status as a low cost
labor location where products are produced and exported to more lucrative markets.
Rather, China represents a source of skilled, innovative employees as well as important
growth opportunities for ABB. In fact, in October of 2004 ABB's CEO outlined a
strategy to double revenue in China within 3 years, effectively overtaking Germany as the
company's second largest market (behind the United States). At ABB CNTDS, roughly
90% of all product is shipped to customers within the country.
5 Nicholas G. Carr, "IT Doesn't Matter", Harvard Business Review, May-June (2003)
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ABB CNTDS alone was given the goal of more then doubling revenue within three years.
Local management recognized the need to manage growth effectively as the main
challenge facing the organization. Accompanying these lofty expectations included a
corporate investment in a new factory which ABB CNTDS began relocation to in August
of 2004. Furthermore, ABB CNTDS was scheduled to begin production of a new type of
transformer, the Vacuum Cast Coil, in the spring of 2005.
The new factory, however, did not increase production floor space nor include new capital
equipment. Therefore it was recognized that ABB CNTDS would further require the
operational process improvements that were the focus of this internship and the pending
relocation provided an ideal coordinating device and timeframe for change. Strategically,
the goals were to improve:
" Speed
- Supply Chain
* Technology
e Quality
e Organization
6.3. Cultural Lens Analysis
A thorough educational perspective of the Chinese culture and its effect on the workplace
is both beyond the scope of this paper and knowledge of the author. However, I will
attempt to share my observations with the understanding that it is a superficial analysis at
best.
If there has been one constant in China over the past 10 years it is change. Particularly in
the major coastal cities, the gradual opening and transition to a "socialism with Chinese
characteristics" economy has led to tremendous growth, construction, employment
opportunities and personal freedom compared to the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's and
its aftermath. Coinciding, it is only recently that foreigners have become a not so unusual
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sight around China's major cities. From the Communist Revolution in the late 1940's
until China's gradual opening during the 1990's, China was, in effect, closed off from the
rest of the world.
ABB CNTDS' history is an example of the opening up of the Chinese country and
economy. Officially formed in 1994, it is a joint venture between ABB, Ltd. and the
Shanghai Electrical Apparatus Corporation. For more than fifty years prior to the joint
venture, the company was a state owned entity producing distribution transformers for the
local state owned utility. It is very common for foreign companies to enter China with a
joint venture partner rather than as a wholly owned entity. China has staked its future on
foreign direct investment and views business fundamentals as a key aspect of that
investment - in contrast to Japan, which promoted and developed national industries from
within and with little foreign investment. In fact, ABB's joint venture partner company
also has partnerships with some of ABB's competitors including Siemens and ALSTOM.
To be sure, the Chinese recognize their recent importance in the world economy as a
location for relatively low cost labor - both manual and skilled. They also recognize the
importance of foreigners in China as representatives of capital and business leadership.
There also are a large number of people within the cities and factories who have come
from the rural interior regions and provinces and understand the large gap in relative
wealth between the coastal cities and those inland.
ABB is a competitive employer in China and has been ranked by Fortune Magazine as one
of the top ten employers in China as well as one of the most admired companies in China.
Even during my brief internship, there were a few people who retired after long-term
careers that began with the state owned company and continued with the joint venture
partnership. ABB CNTDS provides all employees with a cafeteria lunch as well as shuttle
bus transportation from various points in the city to the factory. Since inception there has
been a steady flow of site General Managers all of whom were non-Chinese. Partnering
with the General Manager is a Deputy General Manager who is the Chinese joint venture
partner representative. It seemed to me most employees felt appreciation for and
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commitment to their employer and were eager to affect changes that would have a positive
impact on the health of the company.
The larger culture of ABB, Ltd. is not without impact on the local subsidiary. A self
described engineering company, ABB prides itself on its engineering competence and
ability to provide unique solutions for customer's problems. The projects that ABB
promotes internally typically are large scale engineering feats such as the Three Gorges
Dam project in China and the "longest underwater power transmission link" soon to be
located between Norway and the Netherlands. Locally, this corresponds to a tendency to
over-engineer less complicated projects without consideration for the effect on throughput,
inventory and operating expenses.
6.4. Stakeholder Lens Analysis
Individual power at ABB CNTDS is derived primarily from two areas:
1. The hierarchical structure of the organization chart
2. Respect for experience and knowledge consistent with Chinese values
The power inherent in the organizational structure presented difficulties implementing
change and required cognizant awareness and ultimately a change in the organization
structure to achieve the desired goals. Most notable is the control of the sales department
by the general manager. This effectively gives the sales department influence over the rest
of the organization as issues concerning the sales were frequently escalated upwards
through the general manager and then down through the rest of the company. The result
was indirect control over manufacturing and planning by the sales department rather than a
balanced partnership between departments. Frequent changes in priority and scheduling
created disruptions in the factory that contributed to many of the identified concerns
including the high material, WIP and finished goods inventory as well as a deteriorating
response time spiral.
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Figure 19: AB3B CNTDS Org Chart, June, 2004
An additional by-product of the organizational chart was that subordinates typically did
not challenge the status quo. Unfortunately, this is detrimental to the idea of continuous
improvement from below. In fact, many factory "blue collar" workers did not view
continuous improvement as part of their responsibility. Even within office functions little
thought was given to potential improvements that would benefit the company as a whole.
Whereas major changes can be implemented effectively with a top down approach, the
smaller innovations that occur continuously and require individuals to think outside their
standard work procedures are missed when the individual has a narrowly focused work
model.
Respect for experience and knowledge is a source of power that should not be overlooked
at ABB CNTDS. Inclusive in this is respect for the knowledge and experience that comes
with age; however, it is not limited specifically to age. Undeniably, there is a noticeable
workplace appreciation for elders that is typically not as prevalent in the United States.
But I also found that background information such as education and previous work
experience can be a useful source of influence for the individual.
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6.6.5. Using the Lenses
In 2003, the Transformers Business Area of ABB initiated an effort to introduce lean
concepts into its factories around the world. Common Pull Production Practices (CP3)
began at two sites in Europe and was more a set of guidelines and methods to help
facilitate operational improvements such as reduced lead times and inventory reduction
than a step by step directive. Rightly, ABB recognized that with such a diverse group of
factories spread around the world, it would be futile to try to develop an a definitive
instruction set.
Additionally, ABB realized the importance of a "pull" approach to implementation - that
is, having factories establish a change initiative on their own as opposed to being "pushed"
to do so from the corporate business area. This is because when there is a shared vision
and common direction among change agents, there a greater likelihood of producing
meaningful results. 56 However, in order to create this pull, ABB needed to prove the
program's potential with results from key sites.
As previously mentioned, ABB CNTDS presented a very good opportunity to showcase
improvements as a result of CP3 implementation and therefore the program was pushed
upon the factory by the business area. A CP3 project manager from Finland and a part of
ABB's Corporate Research Center was brought in and tasked with the CP3
implementation. He arrived in January of 2004 and this internship in support of his efforts
began a few months after.
Many multinational companies that have used ex-pat managers extensively in their China
operations are now looking to train and develop local personnel for factory management
positions. There still remains a case, however, for using outsiders when significant
strategic improvements are pushed from the corporate level. As someone who obviously
stands out as different in a homogenous environment such as China, a foreigner is often a
visual signal that change is forthcoming, just as it has been since the early 1990s. Not
only is an outsider a visual cue, but an outsider can use ignorance as leeway when
navigating through the political and cultural barriers.
5' Kanter, et al, The Challenge of Organizational Change, (The Free Press, 1992).
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I found that being a foreigner, I was given more 'ignorance flexibility' than would a local
outsider. It seems, however, this approach is appropriate only when the strategic changes
are significant and obvious enough to create a barrier to falling back into the old method
of operating. Furthermore, I found that by integrating into the culture as much as possible
(ex: learning some of the language, trying local cuisine, having an interest in the culture
and history) one can avoid an insensitive stigma alongside the useful ignorance flexibility.
Strategically, the goals of CP3 were straightforward. However, with five key objectives
different departments or individuals are typically given ownership for only one of the five.
This can create barriers against working together. Instead, in line with responsive
manufacturing theory, at ABB CNTDS the fundamental goal was fashioned as speed with
the other four becoming areas to support the improvement of speed. As discussed
previously, aligning the organization to improve speed has tremendous widespread
application within a company. Most importantly it requires departments to work together
and break down barriers that contribute to waste.
Goals
Speed
Speed I I I I
Supply Chain P 0 A 0
Technology
Quality 0..
-. 0Organization
Figure 20: CP3 Goals
Taking into account the influence associated with the organizational hierarchy, ABB
CNTDS needed to reorganize the departments in order to increase the rate of
implementation and ultimately the success of the strategic vision. In September of 2004
the Operational Process manager responsible for the strategic operational improvements
was also given responsibility for overseeing the entire Manufacturing and Operations
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department including the Factory, Planning, Purchasing, and the Warehouse (previously
under control of the Finance department).
Within this new structure, the factory personnel were more willing to accept operational
changes and WIP management policies. The planning department was influenced to
change the time scope and planning process to improve responsiveness. Furthermore, the
material purchasing department was tasked with reducing inventory and the warehouse
was given responsibilities for JIT material delivery to workshop cells and better
organization and record-keeping of items in stock.
To be sure, these improvements were not a carte-blanche directive from management. A
great deal of teaching, partnering and communication went into ensuring understanding
and acceptance. Additionally, implementation was coordinated and meticulous. For
example, 5S and cellular layout was done in one area first to allow everyone to see results
and "pull" changes in their areas. The ConWIP policy was implemented on the Dry
Production line first and subsequently "pulled" to the Oil Production line by line
supervisors. Additionally, simple software tools were utilized for inventory management
of key items and then new applications developed as requested for other tasks.
General Manar
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Sakes Division TechnicalDihision Mfg Diision Supplier
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Figure 2 1: ABB CNTDS Org Chart, September, 2004
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Understanding strategically where the organization needs to be in order to succeed is only
a portion of what is required to get there. Whether you are an outsider or an insider, in a
country native or foreign, working in an organization familiar or new, looking at the
situation through of the three lenses can provide valuable insight into how the organization
functions on a daily basis and over the long term. It is a critical step in the overall change
process and one that is useful when considering strategic initiatives.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
Responsive competition requires a significant change in how the modem production center
should prioritize decisions. Table 1 reviews some of these ideas.
Cost Manufacturing Responsive Manufacturing
Lower Costs Reduce Time
Financial Results Physical Results
Utilization Throughput
Individual / Departments Teams / Integration
Table 1: Cost vs. Responsiveness57
One would be hard pressed to find a business that does not consider pleasing the customer
as a top objective. However, one does have to spend time finding businesses that convert
this objective into operational practice. Everybody knows that customers do not want to
have a choice between a black car and a black car as Henry Ford originally provided. So
why is it then, that while our intuitive concept of what manufacturing should produce has
changed, our understanding of how manufacturing firms should operate has not?
I hope this thesis has not presented the reader with the conclusion that factories should
operate recklessly with a lack of regard for the costs associated with decisions. But rather
that factories should look at more than just short term tangible costs when making
operational decisions and designing operational strategies. Furthermore, I hope this thesis
has provided the reader with the optimism that manufacturing can be both profitable and
responsive while providing an advantage in today's competitive environment.
57 George Stalk, Jr., and Thomas M. Hout, Competing Against Time, (Free Press, 1990).
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Appendix A: ConWIP Parameters 58
The ConWIP parameters are:
m: the number of ConWIP cards allowed in the line. Thus, this determines the
maximum WIP level for the ConWIP system.
q: target production quota for a period.
n: maximum work ahead amount. If q + n is produced during a period, the line is
stopped until the next period.
r: capacity shortage trigger indicating additional capacity is required. Additional
capacity can include overtime, bringing idle equipment online, outsourcing, etc.
A simple trigger would be if production fails to exceed q-r units during a given
time period. A more sophisticated approach would include the probability of not
producing q-r units for the time period given the number of units produced up to
the current state.
There are economic trade-offs between the parameters. Increasing q tends to increase
revenue at the expense of service levels. Increasing m or n increases service levels at the
expense of inventory and time.
58 Spearman, et al. "CONWIP: a pull alternative to kanban.", int. J. Prod. Res., 28:5 (1990)
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Appendix D: ConWIP Card
Job # Contract Type
Finish Production
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Appendix E: Cross Department Integration pull production plan. The shaded region represents the stakeholders required to participate in the
weekly pull production meeting.
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Appendix F: Production Scheduling Tool sequencing result.
Contract
Review Date
(vvvv/mm/dd) T'ps
12/10/2004 SCR-3150
12/10/2004 SCR-2000
12/10/2004 SCR-2000
1/10/2005 SCR9- 10000
12/13/2004 SCR-2500
12/13/2004 SCR-2500
12/10/2004 SCRZ-5000
12/13/2004 SCR-2500
12/13/2004 SCR-2500
12/10/2004 SCR-3 150
12/10/2004 SCR-2000
12/10/2004 SCR-2000
12/10/2004 SCR-500
12/10/2004 SCRZ-5000
1/10/2005 SCR9- 10000
12/20/2004 SCR-400
12/10/2004 SCR-400
12/10/2004 SCR-3150
12/15/2004 SCR9-2000
12/13/2004 SCR9-1250
12/13/2004 SCR9-1250
12/13/2004 SCR9-1250
Closest Model
Type
SCR 10 / 3150 KVA
SCR 10/2000KVA
SCR 10 / 2000 KVA
SCR 35 / 10000 KVA
SCR 10/2500KVA
SCR 10 / 2500 KVA
SCRZ 35 / 5000 KVA
SCR 10 / 2500 KVA
SCR 10 / 2500 KVA
SCR 10 / 3150 KVA
SCR 10 / 2000 KVA
SCR 10 / 2000 KVA
SCR 10 / 630 KVA
SCRZ 35 / 5000 KVA
SCR 35 / 10000 KVA
SCR 10 / 400 KVA
SCR 10 / 400 KVA
SCR 10 / 3150 KVA
SCR 10 /2000 KVA
SCR 10/ 1250 KVA
SCR 10/ 1250 KVA
SCR 10/ 1250 KVA
-r 4t
Job No.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Contract
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Finish
Production
(yyyV/mm/dd)
12/6/2004
12/4/2004
12/4/2004
1/5/2005
12/8/2004
12/8/2004
12/31/2004
12/12/2004
12/12/2004
12/13/2004
12/10/2004
12/10/2004
12/9/2004
1/5/2005
1/15/2005
12/10/2004
12/14/2004
12/20/2004
12/16/2004
12/18/2004
12/18/2004
12/18/2004
Start
Insulation
11/22/2004
11/23/2004
11/23/2004
11/23/2004
11/25/2004
11/25/2004
11/26/2004
11/29/2004
11/29/2004
11/29/2004
11/30/2004
11/30/2004
12/1/2004
12/1/2004
12/2/2004
12/3/2004
12/5/2004
12/6/2004
12/6/2004
12/7/2004
12/7/2004
12/7/2004
Oiam
Enter
Winding
11/23/2004
11/24/2004
11/24/2004
11/29/2004
11/26/2004
11/26/2004
11/29/2004
11/30/2004
11/30/2004
11/30/2004
12/1/2004
12/1/2004
12/2/2004
12/4/2004
12/8/2004
12/4/2004
12/6/2004
12/7/2004
12/7/2004
12/8/2004
12/8/2004
12/8/2004
Leave
Winding
11/24/2004
11/25/2004
11/25/2004
12/6/2004
11/27/2004
11/27/2004
12/3/2004
12/1/2004
12/1/2004
12/1/2004
12/2/2004
12/2/2004
12/2/2004
12/8/2004
12/15/2004
12/4/2004
12/6/2004
12/8/2004
12/8/2004
12/9/2004
12/9/2004
12/9/2004
Winding
Hours
42
33
33
189
39
39
115
39
39
42
33
33
21
115
189
20
20
42
33
25
25
25
Start
Winding
48
48
48
49
48
48
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
50
49
50
50
50
50
50
50
KVA
3150
2000
2000
10000
2500
2500
5000
2500
2500
3150
2000
2000
630
5000
10000
400
400
3150
2000
1250
1250
1250
72
Appendix G: Production Scheduling Tool chart showing planned weekly capacity. Note: Week 5 is the Chinese New Year Holiday period.
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Appendix H: Steel inventory tracking showing inventory weights by width dimension.
The weights are converted to a length dimension via the software tool.
30ZH105 Og AZU Steel Inventory
12/17
2830 2600 2165 2280 2845 3225 2600 2440 3285 2965 3180
3400 3360 3460 3355 3220 3285 2595 2600 3265 3320 2985
3215 2790 3005 2445 2995 3295 3265 2385 2480 2145
A B c F G
120 312
150 360 243 478 478 358
160 300 229 261 221 221 233 233 379 325 346 343
-170_ 327
2M 566
27O 672
290 480
310 818 787 797 797 815 736 669 572 732 776 672
561 548 602 919 684 810
30ZH105 0 i40 Steel Inventory
12/17
mA (mm) 7 - Lengths y- (_
1000 1233 1133 943 993 1240 1405 1133 1063 1431 1292 1386
1481 1464 1508 1462 1403 1431 1131 1133 1423 1447 1301
1401 1216 1309 1065 1305 1436 1423 1039 1081 935
A -B C D Er V G-K
120 1133
150 1046 706 1389 1389 1040
160 817 624 711 602 602 635 635 1032 885 942 934
170 - 838
m 220 1121
270 - 1084
290 721
310 1150 1106 1120 1120 1146 1035 940 804 1029 1091 945
_ _ - 789 770 846 1292 961 1139
74
Appendix I: Analysis of Monthly Foil Consumption
75
Type Dry Dry Dry Dry Dry Dry Dry Dry Dry
Size .5*820 .5*860 .6*690 .6*740 .8*720 .8*780 1*720 1*840 1.2*820
Jan'03 373 0 1075 934 1045 0 702 2090 1785
_I~e'O3& ~9 >A 782~ 761F 2921
Mar'03 743 247 0 1371 822 1371 1463 372 2597
,,Apr~O 2.3 0it -- 37 P ~2190 i: _78
May'03 190 252 1970 1442 4172 838 1824 730 3516
0 -00 0, - IW ______
Lin 64 5 26 440 -1501 018 0
Jul'03 380 118 0 458 0 1204 285 1790 4244
A0 145 95 2t5 _59 1-91 '03 1779 72
Sep'03 173 416 0 0 668 793 1394 764 2801
oct ,03 418 1509 - 851 558 576 73, 2 723
Nov'03 584 215 0 1742 503 2940 0 1054 1035
Dec.'03 509 0 1Q51 1241 498 30 O W907 6482 2229,
Jan'04 0 820 0 0 0 550 287 1443 3600
PT 0o4 6 956 0 2412" 241 4711 586 3646 109
Mar'04 0 416 190 1895 786 1448 873 0 2396
Apr'04 _ -0 1699 0 501 4043 292 >369& 1496
May'04 340 1203 377 761 250 857 281 853 3491
Jn V04 1574 433 386- 876 2605 1158 1699 2185 1520
Iiqt~
